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CRIMINAL SENTENCING

United States v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 1443
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Alvarado, pleaded guilty of possession with intent to
distribute more than 100 grams of heroin. Alvarado challenged the appropriateness of his sentence. Alvarado contended that the district
court erred by: (1) failing to make express findings regarding the accuracy of disputed information in Alvarado's presentence report; (2) refusing to allow Alvarado to inspect and refute inculpatory information
inspected by the court in camera; and (3) increasing Alvarado's offense
level because of his alleged role as an organizer or leader in the criminal
activity.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. First, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), if a defendant challenges information in a presentence report, the court must either make a factual finding
regarding the accuracy of the information, or expressly state that it is
not relying on the disputed information. This procedure was not followed by the district court, however. Thus, the court remanded the
case. Second, the district court erred in denying Alvarado access to the
in camera material. The court explained that Alvarado's sentencing was
based on material to which he was denied access. This, in essence, conflicts with the requirement that a defendant be permitted to rebut or
explain such material. Finally, the district court's finding that Alvarado
played a managerial role in the criminal activity was not inconsistent
with the factual findings and, therefore, was not an erroneous decision.
Thus, the court did not err in Alvarado's base offense level.
United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 213
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Alvarez, appealed a fifty-one month sentence for his attempted escape from a federal correctional facility. On appeal, Alvarez
alleged that: (1) the district court erroneously categorized him as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) the district
court erred in refusing to find him a minor participant in the escape.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court rejected Alvarez's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court discredited his argument that Congress intended the statute
to apply to career violent offenders and to career drug offenders, but not
to offenders whose current offense is of a different character than prior
offenses. Second, the district court's decision that Alvarez was not a minor participant in the escape was not clearly erroneous. The court reasoned that Alvarez failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was less culpable than others in the offense. Accordingly, no
adjustment in the sentence was warranted.
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United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Arredondo-Santos, appealed his sentence of thirty
months for possession with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms
of marijuana. Arredondo-Santos argued that the district court erred
when it refused to reduce his offense level by two levels. He contended
that as a mere driver he was but a minor participant in the criminal activity and, therefore, less culpable than other participants.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination. The
court reasoned that couriers are indispensable to any drug network. As
the courier, Arredondo-Santos could not argue that he was any less culpable than the people who sold or purchased the drugs. Furthermore,
there was no evidence of other participants. The court noted that when
culpability is weighed, evidence must exist of other participants and
their role in the criminal activity.
United States v. Baker, 914 F.2d 208
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Baker, was convicted of bank robbery and receiving an
explosive in interstate commerce with knowledge that it would be used
to kill, injure, or intimidate other individuals. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Baker's crimes and criminal history would normally dictate a sentence range of fifty-one to sixty-three months. The district
court, however, found two aggravating factors and departed upward
from the Sentencing Guidelines, thereby imposing a seventy month
sentence.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit applied a
three step analysis. First, the court said that the circumstances justified a
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court noted that the
dangers inherent with dynamite justified the departure. Second, the
court found that the circumstances given by the district court for departure actually existed. Finally, the court held that the degree of the district court's departure was reasonable.
United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Barry, appealed the district court's order sentencing
him to a prison term subject to a supervised release. Barry argued that
he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the
district court failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(c)(1) ("Rule 11"),
by not informing him of the supervised release.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
reasoned that, although the district court's failure to advise Barry of the
period of supervised release conflicted with the requirements of Rule
11, Barry's substantive rights were not detrimentally affected. The court
found that the district court's error could not have had a significant in-
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fluence on Barry's guilty plea. The court concluded that the district
court's failure to comply with Rule 11 did not warrant a reversal.
United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Beaulieu, was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamines. During trial, Beaulieu's version of the facts was contradicted by several government witnesses. Consequently, the government
contended that Beaulieu obstructed justice by testifying untruthfully.
Accordingly, the government recommended, in a pre-sentence report,
that Beaulieu's sentence be adjusted upward by two levels. Beaulieu appealed, arguing that the upward adjustment for untruthful testimony:
(1) inhibited exercise of his right to testify; (2) deprived him of due
process; and (3) was based on insufficient evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court noted that it is
not unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to evaluate the truthfulness
of a defendant's testimony. The court reasoned that there is no protected right to commit perjury. Thus, adjusting Beaulieu's sentence upward because he gave untruthful testimony did not violate his right to
testify. Second, the court rejected Beaulieu's argument that he was deprived of due process. The court reasoned that it is not unconstitutional
for a sentencing judge, who observed a defendant at trial, to consider
the defendant's alleged perjury. Third, there was sufficient evidence to
support the district court's finding that Beaulieu obstructed justice by
testifying untruthfully. The court based its decision on Beaulieu's testimony and deferred to the district court's credibility assessments. Accordingly, the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was perjury was
not clearly erroneous.
United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Bernhardt, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. He subsequently appealed the district court's imposition of a sentence greater
than that proscribed by the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court outlined criteria used for reviewing an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) circumstances cited by the district court must justify the
departure; (2) circumstances used to justify the departure must actually
exist in the instant case; and (3) the departure must be reasonable. The
court stated that Bernhardt's criminal history was not adequately reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, such "under-reflection" justified an upward departure. Second, the district court made
proper factual determinations regarding Bernhardt's lengthy criminal
record. Third, the upward departure was reasonable. The court explained that the departure was guided by possible sentences in higher
categories.
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Birr v. Shillinger, 894 F.2d 1160
Per Curiam
Defendant, Birr, pleaded guilty to accessory to felony murder and
accessory to the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and twenty to twenty-five
years for the robbery, with the sentences to run consecutively. Birr subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by
the district court. He, therefore, appealed the denial of his writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that his sentences for felony murder and the underlying
felony violated the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court stated that, in cumulative sentencing situations, the double jeopardy clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Thus,
federal courts must defer to a state court's determination of legislative
intent. Here, a majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court, in affirming
Birr's convictions and sentences, held that the Wyoming legislature intended cumulative punishment for accessory to felony murder and accessory to the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. Given the
required legislative intent to impose multiple punishment, the court
found no violation of the double jeopardy clause.
United States v. Bishop, 921 F.2d 1068
Author: Judge Barrett
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Bishop, was convicted on two counts of bank robbery by
force, violence and intimidation. Bishop's presentence report reflected
a criminal history of larceny by fraud and knowingly concealing stolen
property. These previous felony charges were consolidated for sentencing, and Bishop was subsequently sentenced to three years concurrent
imprisonment on each count. His previous sentences were treated as
one for the purpose of Bishop's criminal history, and only three criminal
history points, rather than nine, were considered in assigning a criminal
history category. Concluding that the criminal history points did not
adequately reflect the seriousness of Bishop's past criminal conduct, the
district court departed upward and sentenced him to seventy-one
months. On appeal, Bishop argued that the district court erred in computing his sentence. Specifically, Bishop argued that his three prior
felonies were, in fact, related because they were part of a common
scheme or plan. Also, he argued that his criminal history category was
not significantly under-represented by the three criminal history points.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The parties agreed that
the review would be governed by a three-step test: (1) whether the circumstances cited by the district court justified a departure; (2) whether
there was a sufficient factual basis for the justifications cited; and
(3) whether the degree of departure was reasonable. Bishop only chal-
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lenged the departure, not the degree of departure, so the court's review
was limited to the first two steps. The circumstance cited by the district
court was that Bishop had two prior felony convictions for which he received no criminal history points. The factual basis for considering
these to be unrelated felonies was sufficient. Thus, the district court was
justified in concluding that Bishop's criminal history category did not
adequately reflect his criminal background.
United States v. Blackner, 901 F.2d 853
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Defendant, Blackner, appealed his mandatory ten year sentence following his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
Blackner argued that the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) violated due process and the eighth amendment as
applied to a drug addict, since narcotic addiction is not a criminal offense. He argued further that his conviction violated equal protection
because he would have received a different sentence under state law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ten year sentence.
The court held that the sentence provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)
applied to Blackner, since possession with intent to distribute cocaine is
a culpable act separate from addiction. The court also held that different penalties under federal and state law for the same type of offense do
not constitute an equal protection violation.
United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d 842
Author: Judge Brimmer, sitting by designation
Defendant, Boyd, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. Boyd
subsequently appealed the sentenced imposed by the district court. She
argued that the amount of narcotics used to determine her offense level
was incorrect. Essentially, Boyd stated that in plea negotiations, she revealed the amount of cocaine that both her sister and mother carried for
her. Boyd argued that these amounts were improperly used to increase
her base offense level.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district
court. The court explained that Boyd's sentence was not enhanced by
information she volunteered in the plea negotiations. Rather, such information was supplied by her sister, and Boyd simply corroborated the
"story." Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
aggregating the quantity of narcotics used to determine Boyd's
sentence.
United States v. Bruning, 914 F.2d 212
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Bruning, pleaded guilty to passing counterfeit notes in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. He subsequently appealed the district
court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines which increased his
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base offense level. Bruning argued that his sentence should not be increased because note 3 of § 2B5.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines recommends prohibiting application of subsection (b)(2) to persons who
produce counterfeit notes by photocopying.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Bruning's argument and, therefore, affirmed the decision of the district court. The court ruled that note 3
excluded application of subsection (b)(2) to only those defendants who
produce notes that are so obviously counterfeit that they are unlikely to
be accepted even if subjected to only minimal scrutiny. Thus, the
method of production was not dispositive.
United States v. Calderon-Porras,911 F.2d 421
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Calderon-Porras, was convicted for smuggling marijuana. He subsequently appealed his sentence, claiming that he should
have been classified as a minimal participant because his actions were
those of an amateur. Moreover, he contended that he was entitled to a
lesser sentence because he was a one-time courier.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
ruled that Calderon-Porras should not be classified as a minimal participant because: (1) lack of knowledge, not skill, in the criminal undertaking is critical for a determination of minimal participant status; and (2) a
courier may be classified as a minimal participant.
United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462
.
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Callihan, pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture,
possessing with intent to distribute, and distributing amphetamines in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 486. Callihan was subsequently sentenced to
120 months in prison based on a seized volume of ninety-four kilograms
of chemicals used to make phenyl-2-propanone ("P2P"), a controlled
substance. Callihan appealed, contending that: (1) the sentence should
have been fifty-seven months since only 2.95 kilograms of P2P was
seized; and (2) the footnote used in the Sentencing Guidelines was rewritten to mean that the controlled substance found in the "entire
amount," should be used as the scale weight, rather than the weight of a
mixture or compound containing the controlled substance.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing. The
court explained that the sentencing manual and significant case law substantiate that "mixture or compound" includes the agent carrying the
controlled substance. Therefore, the district court used the appropriate
offense level.
Carbray v. Champion, 905 F.2d 314
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Carbray, was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon
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in an Oklahoma state court. Thejury recommended, and the trial judge
imposed, a 199 year prison term. The term was based, in part, on the
Oklahoma recidivism statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51(A)(1)(1981). The
Court of Criminal Appeals reduced the term to seventy-five years after
finding the prosecutor's remarks concerning possible pardon or parole
were prejudicial. In his habeas corpus petition, Carbray appealed, alleging
that: (1) the district court improperly considered four felony convictions to enhance his sentence because they all resulted from an invalid
1957 juvenile conviction; and (2) the Criminal Court of Appeals arbitrarily resentenced him to seventy-five years, thereby depriving him of
liberty without due process of law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to enhance
Carbray's sentence. The court explained that any connection between
Carbray's 1957 conviction and the four felony convictions was too attenuated to amount to constitutional error. Second, the court ruled that
the reduction in Carbray's sentence did not violate the fourteenth
amendment. The court explained that an appellate court may constitutionally exercise discretion and modify ajury sentence on appeal if it has
been granted authority to do so by the state. The court found the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals only had discretion to modify a
sentence to the statutory minimum. Since the district court resentenced
Carbray to the statutory minimum, the reduction was not arbitrary.
United States v. Colbert, 894 F.2d 373
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Colbert, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. He was subsequently sentenced to 264 months of incarceration. Colbert appealed his sentence, contending the Sentencing
Guidelines constitute cruel and unusual punishment in denigration of
the eighth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court ruled that Colbert's base offense level was not disproportionate to what Congress and
other jurisdictions have indicated as appropriate for drug offenses.
Moreover, the court noted Congress' intent to create severe penalties
for drug offenders. Accordingly, the court held the Sentencing Guidelines do not violate the eighth amendment.
Murray v. Cowley, 913 F.2d 832
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Murray, appealed a district court order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Murray contended that the district court
erred in finding no equal protection violation when the state court refused to reduce his sentence. Specifically, the state court would not reduce his sentence for second degree murder from an indeterminate
term of life to a definite sentence of ten years, following a change in the
second degree murder statute.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68:4

The Tenth Circuit dismissed Murray's appeal. The court found that
Murray was not similarly situated to persons convicted under new second degree statutes. Accordingly, the state's refusal to reduce Murray's
sentence, as if he had been convicted under the new statute, did not
violate due process. The district court, therefore, did not err in denying
Murray's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Creech, appealed an upward departure in his sentence.
The district court adjusted upward because it found the victim of his
crime to be "vulnerable" within the meaning of Sentencing Guideline
§ 3Al.1. The victim was chosen from a list of newlywed persons.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that unless the criminal act is
directed against the young, aged, handicapped, or unless the victim is
chosen because of some unusual personal vulnerability, § 3Al.1 cannot
be employed. The court held that application of the guideline was
clearly erroneous because it did not focus on the victim, but rather upon
a class of persons to which the victim belonged.
Davis v. Maynard, 911 F.2d 415
Per Curiam
Defendant, Davis, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
The Tenth Circuit upheld his murder conviction but vacated his death
sentence. The court ruled that the district court's anti-sympathy and
aggravating circumstance instructions were overbroad. The Supreme
Court subsequently vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Sajle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct. 1257
(1990). Saffle held that an anti-sympathy instruction constituted a "new
rule" which could not be applied on collateral review of a criminal
judgment.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original judgment, vacating Davis' death sentence. The court ruled that although the antisympathy instruction constituted the creation of a "new rule," the aggravating circumstance instruction did not. The court explained that its
original ruling regarding the aggravating circumstance instruction was
dictated by precedent existing before Davis' conviction became final.
United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, Gerald and Lowell Donaldson, appealed their
sentences after pleading guilty to drug conspiracy charges. On appeal,
the Donaldsons: (1) challenged the validity of the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) asserted the district court erred in determining the weight
of the marijuana seized by the government. Moreover, Gerald Donald-
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son separately argued that the district court erred in failing to declare
him a minor participant and reducing his base offense level accordingly.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holdings. The court
held that the Donaldsons' constitutional attack on the Sentencing
Guidelines was without merit because the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit had previously rejected their arguments. Second, using a clearly
erroneous standard of review, the court upheld the district court's determination of the drug's weight. The court explained the Donaldsons did
not meet their burden in proving bad faith by the government in destroying the seized marijuana before the Donaldsons had an opportunity
to examine it. Finally, the court upheld the district court's refusal to
reduce Gerald Donaldson's base offense level. The court reasoned that
drug couriers are not necessarily minor participants under the Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, the court ruled that Donaldson was no less culpable than the other participants and thus not deserving of an offense level
reduction. Moreover, Gerald Donaldson's due process rights were not
violated when the district court failed to state its reasons for not giving
him a reduction in base offense level. There is no legal requirement that
a judge state reasons for his finding of fact.
United States v. Doyan, 909 F.2d 412
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Doyan, pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine
with the intent to distribute. The district court subsequently sentenced
and fined Doyan. Doyan appealed his fine, contending: (1) the district
judge abused his discretion and violated the Sentencing Guidelines; and
(2) the imposition of the fine under the Sentencing Guidelines violated
Doyan's equal protection rights under the federal constitution.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the fine. First, the court ruled that the
district court judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing a fine in
excess of $32,000. The Sentencing Guidelines state that a court has discretion over the fine to be imposed. The court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines mandate a punitive fine sufficient to cover the costs
of incarceration. The Sentencing Guidelines, however, impose no obligation to tailor the fine according to a defendant's ability to pay. Second, Doyan's equal protection rights were not violated by the imposition
of a fine. The court explained that it could not say the fine "bore" no
rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in criminal
justice.
United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Easterling, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and to use of a firearm during the commission of a
drug trafficking crime. The district court voiced its dissatisfaction with
the first presentence report because it did not adequately reflect the
seriousness of Easterling's conduct. Consequently, a second report was
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prepared indicating that Easterling was involved in the distribution of
substantially larger amounts of methamphetamine. On appeal, Easterling argued that: (1) during sentencing, the district court erred in
relying on the second presentence report because it was based on estimates lacking any articulable basis; (2) the government breached the
plea agreement; and (3) the district court erred in failing to consider
mitigating circumstances.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. First, the court upheld
the district court's determination regarding the quantity of drugs involved. The court explained that the determination was not clearly erroneous. The court also stated that factual determinations under the
Sentencing Guidelines require only a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, the use of estimates is acceptable as long as the information
upon which the estimates are based have a minimum indicia of reliability. Further, the court found that the drug quantity information was not
improperly obtained by the probation officer's overreaching. The court
explained that the information came independently of Easterling and
prior to his cooperation. Second, the court found that any breach of the
plea agreement was immaterial because the district court reduced the
sentence to reflect Easterling's cooperation. The court also found that
information in the presentence report regarding the quantity of narcotics involved was not a breach of the plea agreement. The court explained that a probation officer is not prohibited from providing
relevant information to the court. Third, the court ruled that the district
court properly considered mitigating circumstances. Finally, the court
ruled that the district court failed to append a written record of disputes
concerning the factual accuracy of the presentence report. Consequently, the court remand for the district court to perform this ministerial task.
United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297
Per Curiam
Defendant, Emrick, appealed the district court's upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's upward departure. The court stated that whether a case's circumstances
justify an upward departure is a question of law. To determine if such
circumstances exist, fact finding must be involved. The court ruled that
due to the absence of adequate findings by the district court, it could not
conduct an appropriate review. Consequently, the court remanded for
appropriate findings.
United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443
Author: ChiefJudge Holloway
Defendant, Florentino, appealed his sentence resulting from a conviction for transporting illegal aliens and aiding and abetting. Florentino claimed the district court erred in "double counting" his prior
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convictions when calculating his offense level and criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines. Florentino also objected to the
use of the same prior convictions in sentencing him at the top of the
applicable Sentencing Guideline range.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. On de novo
review, the court examined the enhancement provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found the Sentencing Guidelines to be unambiguous. The court stated that there was a clear intention to have prior
convictions for transporting illegal aliens count towards increasing both
Florentino's offense level and criminal history category. Moreover, the
court rejected Florentino's contention that the district court improperly
counted his earlier convictions when sentencing him at the top of the
Sentencing Guideline range.
United States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 477
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Fortenbury, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm.
The district court judge did not believe that Fortenbury's criminal history accurately reflected the seriousness of past criminal conduct and,
therefore, made an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
Fortenbury appealed the sentence imposed by the district court.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. The
court applied a three step test to determine if the upward departure in
sentencing was justified. First, the court ruled that the district court
properly identified the circumstances which warranted the upward departure in sentencing. The circumstances were that Fortenbury was
treated leniently in the past for other offenses, and the leniency did not
deter future criminal activity. Second, the court ruled that the basis for
the upward departure in sentencing was not clearly erroneous. The
court stated, however, that the upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines was unreasonable. The court explained that upgrading the
offense level to determine sentencing was an improper application of
the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Fredrick, 897 F.2d 490
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Fredrick, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin with intent to distribute. She subsequently appealed her sentence. Specifically, Fredrick contended that the district court violated her due process
rights by considering non-charged criminal activity in computing her
sentence. In addition, Fredrick challenged the Sentencing Commission's 1988 revision of the Sentencing Guidelines. The revision mandates consideration of non-charged criminal activity in reaching a
sentence.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that the district court did
not violate Fredrick's due process rights by considering non-charged

660

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68:4

criminal activity. The court explained that these criminal activities were
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Sentencing
Commission's 1988 revision did nothing more than identify several aspects of relevant conduct, just as the earlier guideline did. Thus, the
revision was within the Sentencing Commission's statutory authority.
The judgment of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Freitekh, 912 F.2d 421
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Freitekh, pleaded guilty to unlawful receipt of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to sentencing, he was arrested on two state charges of aggravated assault, which did not appear
on his criminal record at sentencing. The district court subsequently
agreed to suspend Freitekh's sentence provided that he participate in a
halfway house program, pay a fine, and participate in a substance abuse
program. Freitekh failed to return to the halfway house on the day he
was convicted of the state charges. Consequently, he was arrested for
failure to comply with federal probation. Thus, he was resentenced to
thirty months after the court altered the presentence report to include
the state conviction. Freitekh appealed, challenging the legality of the
district court's upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. Freitekh argued that his sentence was unreasonable because it was three
times the Sentencing Guidelines' maximum limit.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court based its decision on a three step process used in
reviewing upward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) the
district court must set forth specific findings of aggravating circumstances existing in the present situation which were not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission; (2) the district
court's underlying findings of fact must not be clearly erroneous; and
(3) the departure must be reasonable. The court found that the district
court's order failed to state specific reasons for the departure which,
therefore, precluded the court from conducting its review.
United States v. Gamble, 917 F.2d 1280
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Gamble, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty
or more grams of cocaine. Gamble claimed that the guilty plea was in
return for a four year prison sentence. Gamble, however, was sentenced
to ninety-six months in prison. On appeal, Gamble requested that the
sentence be vacated and the four year sentence be imposed. Alternatively, Gamble requested that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea,
or have an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the government
made a promise to him regarding the length of his sentence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court
reviewed the letter which had been sent to Gamble and his attorney by
the government. The letter clearly stated that any sentence imposed
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would be within the discretion of the district judge. The court took note
that at the sentencing hearing, Gamble failed to mention any promises
made to him by the government concerning the length of his sentence.
Finally, the court ruled that, because the letter from the government was
clear and ambiguous, parol evidence would not be allowed to determine
its meaning. Thus, Gamble's affidavit, filed after the sentencing hearing,
would not effect the court's determination. Accordingly, there was no
need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Garcia, pleaded guilty to transporting illegal aliens,
thereby violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B). He subsequently appealed
his seven month sentence. Even though Garcia admitted his criminal
history category was properly calculated, he nonetheless contended that
the district court improperly considered his prior criminal conviction
and overemphasized his transportation of only three illegal aliens. In
essence, Garcia appealed the district court's decision to impose sentence
at a particular point within the proper guideline range.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's sentencing was
proper and dismissed Garcia's appeal. The court stated that the sentence was not appealable because Garcia was placed within the correct
criminal history category and correct sentencing range. The court explained that sentences are only reviewable if the defendant claims that it
was incorrectly calculated or was based on clearly erroneous factual findings concerning offense levels, characteristics, or adjustments. Garcia,
however, challenged the factors the district court relied on to impose
sentence at a particular point within the Sentencing Guidelines. Consequently, his sentence was not reviewable. Moreover, the court noted
that the Sentencing Guidelines were intended to give sentencing discretion to district courts.
United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Gardner, pleaded guilty to bank robbery by force and
aiding and abetting the commission of a bank robbery. The district
court judge did not believe that Gardner's criminal history accurately
reflected the seriousness of past criminal conduct and, therefore, departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, Gardner
was sentenced to 210 months in prison. Gardner appealed the sentence,
arguing that the upward departure was unreasonable because the district court improperly considered convictions which fell outside the fifteen year limit.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court applied a three pronged test to determine the
validity of the sentence. First, the court held that the district court properly identified circumstances which warranted the upward departure in
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sentencing. For example, the district court properly considered previous convictions, even though they were outside the time limit. The
court reasoned that the convictions were similar in nature to the crime
for which Gardner was sentenced. The second prong of the test was
also satisfied because the factual basis for the upward departure was not
clearly erroneous. Finally, the court held that the upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines was reasonable. The court explained
that the district court upgraded Gardner into a class whose description
most closely matched his history, that of a career offender.
United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Hand, appealed the district court's conviction and
ninety-seven month sentence for his role in aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, Hand contended that:
(1) the government breached the plea agreement by eliciting unfavorable testimony under cross-examination during sentencing, and stating
that the court was free to come to its own conclusion regarding a sentence reduction; and (2) the district court failed to make findings of fact
regarding information contained in the presentence report.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
declared that Hand could not reasonably understand the government's
plea agreement to proscribe a proper cross-examination of Hand and
other witnesses at sentencing. Similarly, a plea agreement cannot be
used to block a court's access to a complete and accurate factual record.
Moreover, the government's statement concerning the court's discretion
to determine a sentence did not amount to a repudiation of its recommendation for a sentence reduction. The court explained that a criminal defendant has no right, as a matter of law, to an enthusiastic
recommendation by a prosecuting attorney. Finally, according to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), factual findings are only required when the defendant disputes a fact contained in the presentence report. Hand did
not identify any inaccurate statement of fact contained in the
presentence report. Instead, he contested the report's legal conclusion.
Consequently, Hand's disagreement over conclusions drawn from the
facts in the presentence report does not allege factual inquiries, thereby
requiring specific findings by the court.
United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Harris, was convicted for aiding and abetting wire fraud.
The district court subsequently departed upward and sentenced Harris
to four years imprisonment. The district court concluded that due to
Harris's past criminal history, it was justified in departing upward from
the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. The
court explained that the district court's upward departure was unreason-
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able. The departure was more than double the twenty-one month maximum sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court stated that
despite a long record of nonviolent, nondrug crimes, Harris did not
meet the requirements for a career offender. He also did not meet the
requirements for one who engages in a pattern of criminal conduct as a
livelihood.
United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613
Author: Judge Cook
Defendant, Hart, appealed the denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce his sentence and his Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 motion to correct
errors in his presentence investigation report ("PSI"). On appeal, Hart
argued that the district court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his
Rule 35 motion; and (2) violated Rule 32 by failing to hold a hearing
regarding the accuracy of information in the PSI or disavowing any reliance on the disputed information.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of both motions. The court
reasoned that since Hart did not contend that his sentence was illegal or
imposed in an illegal manner, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. Second, the court said that Rule 32
only applies to factual inaccuracies. The court found that Hart objected
mostly to the tenor of the report and that the specific factual inaccuracies that he raised would have not influenced the sentence imposed.
United States v. Hughes, 901 F.2d 830
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hughes, pleaded guilty to armed robbery of a bank and
to jeopardizing a life with a dangerous weapon. Because Hughes was
previously convicted of two crimes of violence, the district court ruled
that he was a career offender. The Sentencing Guidelines require a sentence of 262-300 months for a career offender who commits a crime of
violence. Hughes was, therefore, sentenced to 262 months in prison.
He appealed, contending that the sentence violated his eighth amendment rights because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, Hughes argued that the Sentencing Guidelines' career offender
provisions violate the eighth amendment because they aggregate disparate offenses without regard to the seriousness of the offense or the defendant's personal characteristics.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
ruled that the determination of proper penalties is a matter for the legislature, and that sentences within the statutory limits are not considered
cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth amendment requires that a
sentence not be disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Hughes's
sentence for armed robbery was not disproportionate to the gravity of
his crime, particularly since he pointed a submachine gun at a bank
teller. The court also held that because the Sentencing Guidelines allow
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sentencing courts to depart downward in appropriate cases, the eighth
amendment was not violated.
United States v. Irvin, 906 F.2d 1424
Author: Judge McCay, sitting by designation
Defendant, Irvin, was convicted of mail fraud. Irvin subsequently
appealed his sentence, claiming: (1) a pattern of criminal conduct must
continue for a longer period of time than that which occurred here; and
(2) a substantial portion of his income requires a substantial total
income.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit remanded the sentencing to
district court. The court did, however, affirm the district court's interpretation of "substantial period of time" as a well-organized criminal
venture lasting approximately five to seven months. But, the court reversed the district court's interpretation of a substantial portion of income. The court concluded that the sentencing guideline meant an
amount above $6,700. Irvin's income was only $4,894.72.
United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985
Author: Judge Bratton
Defendant, Jackson, was originally sentenced to five years imprisonment for possession of ammunition by a felon. Jackson appealed the
sentence and secured a remand. On remand, the district court departed
upward from the Sentencing Guidelines and resentenced Jackson to five
years imprisonment. Jackson appealed the latter sentence, arguing that:
(1) the second sentence increased his punishment in violation of the
double jeopardy clause; and (2) an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was unwarranted and unreasonable in magnitude.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court found that the
double jeopardy clause was not violated when Jackson was resentenced.
The court reasoned that Jackson had knowledge that the original sentence was appealable and, therefore, he had no expectation that the sentence was final. The court also found that the district court's upward
departure was proper. The district court properly took into account
prior convictions outside the applicable time limit, a criminal history category which did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Jackson's past
criminal conduct, leniency of past sentences, and similarity between
Jackson's present and past criminal offenses. Finally, the court reasoned
that the magnitude of departure was reasonable because "slavish" adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines would cause unwarranted sentencing disparities.
United States v. Kinney, 915 F.2d 1471
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Kinney, pleaded guilty to possession of contraband in
prison. Kinney appealed the sentence imposed. Specifically, he argued
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that during sentencing, the district court improperly held his prior convictions for bank robbery in two separate states as unrelated. Rather,
Kinney contended that the two convictions were related because they
were part of a common scheme and they could have been consolidated.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court's decision was not
clearly erroneous. The court stated that under the Sentencing Guidelines, cases are related if they: (1) occurred on a single occasion;
(2) were part of a single scheme or plan; or (3) were consolidated for
trial or sentencing. The court held that the fact the cases could have
been consolidated does not satisfy the requirement that they be consolidated. Further, a concurrent sentence given by a separate jurisdiction at
a different date was not a consolidated sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Also, the only evidence of a common scheme was Kinney's
own testimony. This was not sufficient to hold the cases as related.
United States v. Kirby, 921 F.2d 254
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Kirby, appealed the twelve month sentence he received
for failing to appear at trial on various drug charges. Kirby argued that
a prior sentence should not have been included in computing his criminal history category because the incarceration was more than fifteen
years before the "commencement of the instant offense."
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court agreed with Kirby. The court concluded that "commencement of the instant offense" meant the date Kirby failed to appear
in court for his drug charges, not the date he committed the underlying
drug offense. Accordingly, since Kirby's prior conviction was beyond
the fifteen year period, the district court erred in considering it when
determining his sentence.
United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Defendant, Kirk, pleaded guilty to unlawful receipt of a sawed-off
shotgun. During sentencing, Kirk argued that he was entitled to a sixpoint reduction in offense level because he possessed the shotgun as
part of a collection and intended to mount it on the wall of his den.
Kirk's presentence report recommended, however, that this point reduction be denied; the gun was found concealed in a drawer, and Kirk made
no effort to mount it. The court accepted the recommendation. Kirk
appealed the sentence, contending that the burden was improperly
placed on him to establish that he was entitled to the point reduction.
Instead, Kirk argued the government must bear the burden of proof on
all sentencing issues.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence after reviewing the allocation of burden of proof as an issue of first impression. Sentencing
Guidelines § 2K2.1 provides for a six-point reduction in the defendant's
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base offense level for unlawful receipt or possession of firearms if the
defendant possessed the firearm "solely for lawful sporting purposes or
collection." This, however, does not address the issue of allocating the
burden of proof. Ultimately, the court held that the government bears
the burden of proof for sentence increases and the defendant for sentence decreases. Here, the sentencing judge properly found that Kirk
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was entitled to a
point reduction.
United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Kuntz, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute less than 100 kilograms of marijuana. The United States agreed
that if Kuntz cooperated, it would consider a motion for departure
downward pursuant to § 5K1.I of the Sentencing Guidelines. Kuntz was
subsequently sentenced to the maximum amount of time in prison for
his offense. Kuntz appealed, contending: (1) that § 5KI.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines was violative of due process and separation of powers; (2) the district court erred in not providing a pre-sentencing
hearing on the issue of diminished capacity; and (3) he was denied effective counsel at sentencing. The prosecutors counter-argued that the
Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear Kuntz's claims. The prosecutors explained that the district court's refusal to depart downward was a
discretionary decision and, therefore, unreviewable.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first ruled that it did have jurisdiction. The court reasoned that a
decision of the district court was not challenged. Instead, the constitutionality of the federal sentencing procedures was challenged. Consequently, the appeal was from a sentence allegedly imposed in violation
of law and was, therefore, properly before the court. The court then
rejected Kuntz's constitutional challenge of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court stated that neither due process nor separation of powers requires a judicial review of a prosecutor's decision not to make a motion
to downgrade a sentence. The court reasoned that sentencing is not an
inherently discretionary judicial function, as evidenced by congressional
control of the procedures, guidelines, and factors of the sentencing
framework. The court did not reach Kuntz's question as to whether he
was improperly denied a hearing on diminished capacity. The court
stated that no request for such a hearing was formally made to the district court. Accordingly, Kuntz waived whatever procedural objection
he may have had. Finally, the court rejected Kuntz's claim that he was
denied effective counsel at sentencing. The court held that this claim
was frivolous.
United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Labat, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine
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with intent to distribute. Labat was sentenced to sixty months in prison
and was ordered to pay fines for the cost of his incarceration. Labat
subsequently appealed, contending that the district court overlooked
additional factors in determining an appropriate fine. In particular, the
district court failed to consider Labat's inability to pay, and it failed to
consider the burden on his dependents. Labat also argued that a fine
for the costs of incarceration is an additional fine which cannot be assessed unless a punitive fine is first levied.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment but vacated the fine. The
court first explained that Labat is indigent and without potential prospects for improving his situation. Moreover, he is without current assets. Further, there is no indication that he can gain employment upon
release from custody that would produce sufficient income to pay the
fine. In effect, the court ruled that it is an incorrect application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to impose a fine that a defendant has little chance
of paying. Second, the court ruled that an additional fine cannot be imposed unless the court first imposes a punitive fine.
United States v. Larsen, 904 F.2d 562
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, Larsen and Brennan, pleaded guilty to single counts of
distribution of lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD"). Both were sentenced pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v), which requires a five
year minimum sentence when more than one gram of LSD is involved.
In' calculating the amount of narcotics distributed, the district court included the weight of the blotter paper which contained the LSD. Larsen
and Brennan argued that this inclusion was improper when determining
their sentences.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
held that the weight of the paper was properly included in determining
the sentences. The court found that Congress intended such mediums
to be calculated in sentencing determinations.
United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Lowden, challenged the district court's decision not to
reduce his sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines. Lowden's conviction was previously affirmed, and the matter was remanded for further
determinations as to the sentence. It was not clear from the record
whether the district court declined to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines because it thought it was powerless to do so or because the
facts did not warrant such a departure.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on remand.
The district court clarified on remand that it had the power to depart
downward, but it declined to do so. The court explained that the district

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68:4

court correctly refused to depart downward based upon the prevalence
of alcohol abuse on Indian reservations.
United States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Maldonado-Campos, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Maldonado-Campos appealed his conviction and sentence, contending that: (1) there was insufficient
circumstantial evidence for a conviction; (2) the district court failed to
properly grant a reduction in the sentence for his status as a minor participant; and (3) the district court failed to depart downward from the
criminal history category when sentencing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence
and remanded for resentencing. First, the court ruled that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. The court explained that Maldonado-Campos need not have carried the suitcases of
marijuana for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly participated in the importation venture. Second, the court
found that the district court's statement regarding "minor" and "minimal" participants was ambiguous and needed further clarification. Consequently, the court remanded for application of the correct legal
standard. Finally, the court stated that it had authority to review the
district court's failure to depart downward. The court reasoned that the
review was proper because the district court misapprehended its power
to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court ruled that it lacked
a sufficient record to determine whether the district court would have
granted a downward departure had it thought itself empowered.
United States v. Mays, 902 F.2d 1501
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Defendant, Mays, pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine. He was
sentenced to a lengthened term of incarceration because the district
court found Mays to be an organizer, leader, or supervisor of criminal
activity. Mays appealed, asserting that: (1) the district court erred in
its factual findings; and (2) the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutionally vague.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that Mays controlled the source of the narcotics, personally
met with the purchasing undercover agent and received money in exchange for cocaine. Thus, the district court's factual findings were correct. The court further held that the terms "organizer," "leader,"
"manager," "supervisor," and "criminal activity" were not unconstitutionally vague. The court explained that the terms were clearly ascertainable by an ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense.
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United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Mendes, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Mendes was subsequently sentenced to a
minimum of ten years in prison. Mendes appealed his sentence on various due process and equal protection grounds. Specifically, Mendes argued: (1) the Sentencing Guidelines are not rationally related to its
purpose of punishing "drug kingpins;" (2) the Sentencing Guidelines
are facially invalid because they set punishment for the amount of the
mixture of drugs not the amount of pure drugs found; (3) § 841(b) of
the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional because it creates a factual
presumption that a person possessing a large quantity of illegal drugs is
a "drug kingpin;" and (4) § 841 (b) of the Sentencing Guidelines should
be declared facially invalid because the punishment is disproportionate
to the crime.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court held that the Sentencing Guidelines more than passed the rational relationship test for presumed valid legislation containing a nonsuspect classification. The court reasoned that there is a legitimate state
interest in controlling both "kingpins" and "managers" at the retail
level. Second, the court held that Mendes did not have standing to challenge the facial validity of § 841(b). The court reasoned that a defendant cannot claim a statute is unconstitutional in some of its reaches if the
statute is constitutional as applied to him. Third, the court held that no
such presumption of "kingpinness" was present in § 841(b), and that
such status was not relevant to the Sentencing Guidelines. Last, the
court ruled that Mendes lacked standing to challenge the facial validity
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, his sentence was not disproportionate for a person possessing the quantities of drugs in his possession and who had a prior felony conviction.
Montoya v. United States Parole Comm'n, 908 F.2d 635
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Montoya, was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine
and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce after a former felony
conviction. Defendant, United States Parole Commission ("Commission"), made a decision to set a release date outside the applicable
guideline range. The Commission informed Montoya that its decision
was based primarily upon a finding that he exhibited a history of assaultive/aggressive behavior. The Commission relied primarily upon Montoya's 1958 robbery and 1967 murder convictions. Montoya filed for
habeas corpus relief, challenging the Commission's decision. The district
court denied relief. Montoya appealed, contending that the record contained no support for the Commission's conclusion that, due to his history of assaultive/aggressive behavior, he was a more serious risk than
indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that, in accordance with congressional intent, departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines is proper only if the Commission has a
rational basis. The court found that there was no rational basis to depart upward. The court explained that Montoya's robbery conviction
was an insufficient display of assaultive/aggressive behavior to warrant
departure. Also Montoya's murder conviction lacked proof of assaultive/aggressive behavior because the- conviction was premised on the felony murder doctrine. In essence, Montoya was not present when the
murders occurred, but was a participant in the underlying crime.
United States v. Moore, 919 F.2d 1471
Author: Judge Cook, sitting by designation
Defendant, Moore, appealed his conviction of cocaine possession,
use of a firearm in relation to possession with intent to distribute, and
use of a machine gun in relation to drug trafficking. Moore challenged
the imposition of consecutive sentences on the two firearm counts as
violating the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. Moore also
questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to link the firearms to
the drug trafficking. Further, he argued that facts alleged in the affidavit
to retain a search warrant were insufficient to show probable cause. Finally, Moore challenged the district court's upward adjustment of his
sentence based on his role as a leader or organizer.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences imposed on the two firearm counts, remanded for resentencing, and affirmed the district court
on all other issues. The court ruled that when more than one firearm is
involved, conviction for a single drug trafficking offense only results in a
single violation of the statute. Accordingly, multiple sentences may not
be imposed. Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that there was a relation between the use of the
firearm and the drug trafficking. Third, the court ruled the affidavit sufficient to show probable cause. The court explained that details in the
affidavit were sufficient to show that cocaine would be found in Moore's
apartment. Also, the court upheld the two-level upward adjustment of
Moore's sentence. The court found a sufficient showing that Moore exercised direction or control over another person in the drug distribution
scheme.
United States v. Oliva-Gambini, 909 F.2d 417
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Oliva-Gambini, pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing cocaine. During sentencing, defendant requested a two-point reduction in his sentence because he claimed to be a minor participant in
the commission of a crime. Specifically, he claimed that because he distributed and did not supply the cocaine, he was substantially less culpable than the average participant. The district court, however,
determined that minor participant status does not apply to drug of-
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fenses. Accordingly, his sentence was not reduced. Oliva-Gambini subsequently appealed his sentence.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit stated that the district court
erred when it held that a defendant convicted of cocaine distribution
could not be classified as a minor participant. The court next considered, under a clearly erroneous standard, whether Oliva-Gambini was
entitled to minor participant status. Oliva-Gambini, however, presented
no evidence that he was less culpable than other participants in the
crime. He only presented a stipulated statement that he was not the
source for the cocaine. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.
Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Gamble, appeared pro se seeking federal habeas corpus relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Gamble alleged that his present sentence
was enhanced by improperly obtained convictions. The district court
denied relief, reasoning that the conviction's collateral consequences,
upon which his sentence was based, were not sufficient to render Gamble "in custody" for purposes of his petition.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Gamble demonstrated he was denied a federal right. Accordingly, he satisfied an element necessary for
the issuance of a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253. Also, the court found that Gamble was "in custody" for statutory purposes. The court explained that Gamble's sentence was enhanced by previous expired convictions. Gamble could, therefore,
challenge his present sentence to the extent that it was enhanced by an
alleged invalid prior conviction.
United States v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Richardson, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to pass counterfeit obligations with intent to defraud the United States. Richardson
appealed his sentence of thirteen months, asserting that the district
court erred in: (1) failing to accept the adjusted offense level contained
in the plea agreement; (2) adhering to the Sentencing Guideline range
in view of the lighter sentences received by others involved in the conspiracy; and (3) calculating the credit for time spent in custody prior to
sentencing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the stipulations in a plea agreement were nonbinding. The court reasoned that
the facts were not known to the district court at the time it accepted the
plea agreement. Therefore, the court found that the district court was
well within its authority, when new facts were discovered, in adding
levels to the offense level. Second, the court held that because the
lighter sentences of the co-conspirators arose out of either a different
court or different laws, the district court's refusal to depart from the
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Sentencing Guidelines was nonreviewable. Finally, the court remanded
for reconsideration the calculation of credit due to Richardson for time
he spent in custody after the commission of the offense.
United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Roberts, pleaded guilty to an information alleging one
count of assault with intent to commit a felony within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Roberts was subsequently sentenced to forty-one months in prison followed by two years
of supervised release. Roberts appealed, challenging his sentence.
Roberts alleged that a proviso of the Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutionally vague. This proviso allows a court to use the offense level
of stipulated conduct when it is more serious than the offense for which
a defendant is convicted. Specifically, Roberts contended the proviso
failed to define "more serious offense," nor does it set out criteria for
determining the seriousness of an offense. Roberts also contested the
district judge incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines for robbery
instead of for aggravated assault.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court found no merit
in Roberts's claim that the proviso of § IB1.2(a) was impermissibly
vague with respect to the term "more serious offense." The court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines provide a clear means by which
the relative seriousness of offenses encompassed by stipulated conduct
can be evaluated. Moreover, the court rejected Roberts's complaint that
the district judge improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines for robbery instead of for aggravated assault. The court reasoned that the stipulated facts established the offense of robbery.
United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1439
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Russell, pleaded guilty to robbing a federally insured
bank, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Russell's sentence was subsequently upgraded by three levels after the district court found that he
possessed a firearm during the robbery. His sentence was further upgraded after his entire criminal history was considered, instead of just
the previous fifteen years as recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. Russell was ultimately sentenced to 105 years in prison. He appealed his sentence, challenging: (1) the district court's finding that he
was armed while committing the robbery; and (2) the enhancement of
the sentence imposed by the district court after considering his entire
criminal history.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment and sentence. The court
found sufficient evidence to support the finding that Russell was armed
during the robbery. This conclusion was reached after reviewing statements made by Russell during the robbery and after determining that he
was in possession of a revolver shortly before and after the robbery.
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Also, the court held that the enhanced sentence imposed after considering Russell's entire criminal history did not violate the Sentencing
Guidelines. The court reasoned that to limit Russell's criminal history
to the fifteen years preceding his sentencing, when he had been in
prison for eleven of those years, would not represent the seriousness of
his past criminal conduct, or the likelihood that he would commit other
crimes.
United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Rutter, pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine. Rutter
subsequently appealed his sentence, contending the district court erred
when it: (1) improperly considered certain amounts of cocaine when
determining his base offense level; (2) characterized him as a supervisor; (3) failed to adhere to the plea agreement during sentencing; and
(4) made insufficient findings of fact to determine the sentence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, but remanded for preparation of the required written record. The court ruled
that under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court may consider quantities of
drugs not specified in the count of conviction but part of the same common plan. Second, the court held that Rutter's reliance on a third party
to transport the drugs for sale was sufficient evidence to characterize
Rutter as an organizer. Third, the district court was free to determine
all relevant facts without being bound by the stipulation included in the
plea agreement. Also, the court noted that the plea agreement stated
that the stipulations were not binding on the district court. Finally, the
district court made sufficient record findings of fact to justify the
sentence.
United States v. Salazar, 909 F.2d 1447
Author: Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation.
Pursuant to an agreement with the government, defendant, Salazar,
pleaded guilty to fabricating false immigration documents. Under this
agreement, the government consented to not bring further charges
against Salazar for any act committed on or before December 31, 1988,
which involved the creation of false documents. Salazar, however, contended that at the sentencing hearing, the government violated the
agreement. Specifically, Salazar argued that the government erred
when, at the sentencing hearing, it mentioned that Salazar committed
the same crime almost 100 times during a seven to eight month period.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing. The
court reasoned that the language of the agreement did not impose obligations on the government in regard to recommending a certain sentence. In fact, the agreement expressly reserved the government's right
to argue for any appropriate sentence.
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United States v. Sanchez, 907 F.2d 127
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Sanchez, was convicted in 1981 on two counts of unlawful possession of food stamps. Sentencing included probation to run
until October 31, 1988. Sanchez was arrested and charged with a drug
offense, however, on October 27, 1988. Following that arrest, a warrant
for his arrest was ordered on October 31, 1988, but not issued until
November 2, 1988. After Sanchez was convicted of the drug charge, his
probation on the prior conviction was revoked. Sanchez appealed the
revocation of probation, arguing that the arrest warrant for the probation revocation was not timely issued.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, reasoning that 18 U.S.C. § 3653 was controlling. Although the warrant was
not issued during the probation period, it was issued within the statutory maximum probation period of five years and was, therefore, valid.
The court determined that the Sentencing Reform Act ("Act"), which
replaced § 3653, applies only to "offenses" committed after November
1, 1987. The Act triggering revocation of probation was not an "offense" within the meaning of the Act. Sanchez's offense was the unlawful possession of food stamps years earlier.
United States v. Sardin, 921 F.2d 1064
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Sardin, and two other defendants pleaded guilty to
maintaining a crackhouse in return for a dismissal of other counts.
Moreover, each defendant also agreed to cooperate with the prosecution. In return, the prosecution agreed not to use, to any of the defendants' disadvantage, information disclosed. The district court
subsequently sentenced each defendant. The district court, however,
departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines because of the large
quantity of drugs involved. Sardin's sentence deviated from the Sentencing Guidelines by a minimum of eighty-three months, while his two
codefendants' sentences deviated by a minimum of only fifteen months
and thirty-five months. This occurred despite the fact that the upward
departure for each was justified by the same quantity of drugs. On appeal, Sardin argued that information disclosed by his codefendants
should not have been used against him and that drug quantity is an impermissible basis for an upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that the codefendants' statements
could be used against him even though Sardin previously disclosed the
identical information. Second, quantity of drugs is a valid factor to consider in determining whether an upward departure is appropriate. The
court then raised the issue, sua sponte, of whether the disparity in
sentences was justified. The court noted that a federal appellate court
should not consider an issue not raised below. The court, however, may
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exercise its discretion to resolve an issue not passed on below which, if
not addressed, would otherwise result in manifest injustice. Consequently, the court determined that there was an unaccounted-for difference which existed between the degree of upward departure in Sardin's
sentence and his co-defendants' sentence. The court noted that when
codefendants have similar criminal histories and engage in the same
misconduct, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate the court to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. Since the record failed to explain the
reason for Sardin's disproportionate sentence, the court reversed and
remanded for resentencing.
United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Smith, pleaded guilty to passing counterfeit notes. As
part of Smith's sentence, the district court imposed an alternative fine of
$225,000. On appeal, Smith argued that the district court misapplied
the Sentencing Guidelines for fines. Specifically, she alleged that the
fine fell outside the applicable range.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court imposed a fine in
excess of the maximum established by the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court vacated the fine and remanded for further sentencing. The court reasoned that the maximum fine allowed is $50,000,
unless the defendant is convicted under a statute authorizing a maximum fine greater than $250,000. Smith was convicted under a statute
that imposed a fine of $5,000. Therefore, the guideline for fines was
misapplied. The court noted that even if the statute, under which the
defendant is convicted, is construed to include the alternative fine statute, the maximum fine allowed is not greater than $250,000.
United States v. Snell, 922 F.2d 588
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Snell, was convicted of aiding and abetting. Prior to
sentencing, Snell filed a motion for ajudgment of acquittal, or, for a new
trial. The district court judge denied this motion, and Snell appealed.
The district court declared the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. As a result of this,
and because Snell made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the prosecution, the district court sentenced Snell below the
minimum level established by the Sentencing Guidelines. The government cross-appealed the downward departure in sentencing, claiming
the district court acted without authority.
The Tenth Circuit held that it was improper for the district court to
make a downward departure in sentencing without a motion filed by the
government. The government's appeal was timely and since the Sentencing Guidelines do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the
sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The
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court affirmed the conviction of Snell after determining there was sufficient evidence of aiding and abetting.
United States v. Sorenson, 915 F.2d 599
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Sorenson, was sentenced to five years imprisonment after pleading guilty to carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking charge, and six months imprisonment after pleading guilty to
maintaining a place for the distribution and use of cocaine. Sorenson
appealed the district court's denial of his motion to compel the government to file a written motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This statute requires a court to depart below the statutory requirement for
criminal sentencing because of a defendant's substantial assistance to
the investigation or prosecution of another person. Sorenson maintained that his plea bargain agreement should have included this
motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court held that in a plea bargain, the government is not required to file
this motion. Moreover, failure to require this motion was not a violation
of Sorenson's substantive or procedural due process rights. The only
instance in which the court can impose this requirement on the government is when the defendant's assistance was so substantial as to demand
meaningful relief.
United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Soto, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Soto requested a downward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines based on the possibility of deportation
for the drug conviction. The district court decided not to depart downward and sentenced accordingly. Soto appealed, claiming the district
court abused its discretion and incorrectly applied the guidelines by not
taking into account his possible deportation.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
court explained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, an appellate court is not
granted jurisdiction over a district court's discretionary refusal to depart
downward from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court also found no
merit in Soto's argument that the refusal to depart downward would result in deportation. The court specifically ruled that a sentencing court
shall not consider the possible deportation of an alien resident for a
drug conviction in deciding whether to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, St. Julian, pleaded guilty to maintaining a premises for
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the purpose of distributing cocaine base. The adjusted guideline recommended a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven months, but the court imposed a sentence of seventy-two months. St. Julian appealed, arguing
that: (1) the district court made an improper upward departure from
the Sentencing Guidelines because drug quantity is not an appropriate
basis to make this determination when the base offense is maintaining a
crackhouse; (2) the district court improperly used drug quantity information obtained under a plea agreement; (3) the district court improperly imposed a two level upward adjustment for St. Julian's failure to
appear at a sentencing hearing; and (4) the district court improperly imposed a two level upward adjustment for possession of weapons.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines but vacated the sentence and remanded
the matter for resentencing. The court reasoned that the district court
failed to provide an adequate and specific statement of reasons supporting the particular sentence imposed. The three-step test for departures
from the guidelines is: (1) whether the circumstances cited by the district court justify a departure; (2) whether there is a sufficient factual
basis for the circumstance cited; and (3) whether the degree of departure is reasonable. Using this three part test, the court ruled that the
quantity of drugs involved was an aggravating factor not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. Thus, the circumstance cited by the district court justified a departure. Consequently, there was a sufficient factual basis that St. Julian was involved
with a certain amount of cocaine base. The district court, however, did
not provide a specific statement of reasons for the particular sentence
imposed. The court, therefore, could not perform its duty to determine
whether the sentence was unreasonable and outside the Sentencing
Guidelines' range. Second, the court found that the district court did
not use drug-quantity information obtained from St. Julian pursuant to a
plea agreement. The court explained that St. Julian failed to allege any
facts that would support his argument that he was the ultimate source of
the drug quantity information. Third, St. Julian's wrongful failure to
appear at a sentencing hearing was a willful obstruction of justice, justifying a two level upward adjustment. Finally, a two level upward adjustment for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense
was justified. The court explained that it was proper despite the fact
that St. Julian was not present when the guns were purchased and was
not in possession of the guns when they were confiscated.
United States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Trujillo, was convicted and sentenced for possession
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and aiding and
abetting. Trujillo appealed his sentence, arguing that: (1) his acceptance of responsibility should result in a downward departure, and his
decision not to make a statement should not be construed as lacking
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acceptance of responsibility; (2) the district court abused its discretion
when it did not find that there was timely acceptance of responsibility;
(3) his sentence should have been the same as his co-defendants, and
the inequality violated his due process and equal protection rights; and
(4) the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines
when it considered the total amount of cocaine found, not just the
amount Trujillo pleaded guilty to possessing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decision.
First, the court stated' that the sentencing judge is entitled to consider
contrition in his sentence reductions. Second, the sentencing court is in
the best position to evaluate demeanor, the timeliness of admissions,
and the quality of admissions in imposing the sentence. Third, the court
stated that no right exists requiring co-defendants to receive the same
sentences. Also, the court found there was no violation of due process
and equal protection rights because Trujillo had time to contest the probation officer's recommendations before sentencing. Finally, the court
ruled that the amount of drugs found can be aggregated for sentencing
purposes.
United States v. Valle-Sanchez, 912 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation
During a FBI undercover investigation, an agent saw a stash of cocaine which defendant, Miguel Valle-Sanchez, admitted amounted to a
(the
Subsequently, Miguel and Pepe Valle-Sanchez
pound.
The
cocaine.
to
distribute
conspiracy
guilty
to
pleaded
"Sanchezes"),
Sanchezes later argued, however, that the district court erroneously calculated the amount of cocaine on which their sentences were based.
Specifically, they argued that: (1) their sentences should not be based
on a larger quantity of drugs than the amount specified in the indictment; (2) only quantities seized or tested and analyzed should be used
in determining their sentences; and (3) the addition of the pound in the
calculation violated the plea agreement.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the court has the discretion to take into
account conduct for which the defendant is not formally charged. Second, the court ruled that it is not necessary to include only the substances seized in the sentencing calculation. Finally, the court stated
that Miguel's admission to possessing a pound of cocaine was prior to
the plea agreement. Therefore, the agreement was not violated.
United States v. Vanderlaan, 921 F.2d 257
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Vanderlaan, appealed his sentence of 210 months for
bank robbery. Vanderlaan contended that the district court erred in
counting a 1973 conviction for career offender liability. Vanderlaan argued that the conviction was barred from consideration because it was
too remote in time. Specifically, he alleged that the conviction did not
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result in a "sentence of imprisonment" within the fifteen year time period because he was sentenced to drug rehabilitation instead of
incarceration.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Upon de novo review of
the Sentencing Guidelines, the court ruled that a restricted drug treatment program, granted in lieu of a prison term, is in fact a "sentence of
incarceration" and could be correctly counted as a previous offense.
The court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines make no distinction
between "sentences of imprisonment" and other types of sentences.
Thus, the court stated that Vanderlaan's sentence was a "sentence of
imprisonment" that resulted in his incarceration within the fifteen years
of the commission of the instant offense. Accordingly, he was correctly
labeled a career offender.
United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, White, pleaded guilty to bank robbery. White appealed
the district court's imposition of a forty-six month prison term arguing
that the upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was unreasonable and clearly erroneous.
The Tenth Circuit held that the departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines was reasonable. The court used a three-step process to determine if the district court's departure was warranted: (1) mitigating
circumstances not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing
Commission must justify a departure; (2) circumstances cited by the district court to justify a departure must actually exist in the instant case;
and (3) the degree of departure from the Guidelines must be reasonable. On de novo review, the court first held that White's criminal history
category score, as calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines, underrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history. Second, the court
stated that White did not dispute the existence of previous forgery
charges or the instant aggravated robbery charge. Also, the court was
not erroneous in concluding that White was out on bail at the time of
the instant offense. Third, the district court closely followed the Sentencing Guidelines' policy statement when it imposed the forty-six
month sentence.
United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 578
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Williams, pleaded guilty to two bank robbery counts.
Williams was previously convicted for four separate bank robberies. According to the Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, Williams's recommended sentence was thirty-seven to forty-six months. The probation
officer, however, suggested an upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines because he believed the recommendation did not reflect the
seriousness of Williams's past conduct or the likelihood that Williams
would commit another crime. The district court agreed and sentenced
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Williams under the career criminal provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Williams argued that the upward departure was not
warranted.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the upward departure under a threepart test. First, the district court must articulate circumstances which
warrant departure and which are not adequately considered by the Sentencing Guidelines. Second, factual findings of the district court must
not be clearly erroneous. Third, the degree of departure must be reasonable. The court found that the district court satisfied this test. Williams's record satisfied the first two requirements, and the district court
acted reasonably in following the career criminal guidelines in determining the sentence.
United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Zamarripa, pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 2244(a)(1), and 2245(3). The district
court subsequently sentenced Zamarripa, departing upward from the
Sentencing Guidelines. Zamarripa appealed, challenging the upward
departure.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's upward departure
was proper if it: (1) ascertained the sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines; (2) addressed the applicable adjustments; and (3) explained the particular circumstances present to support a departure and
why the circumstances were not adequately addressed by the adjustments built into the Sentencing Guidelines. The court was unclear as to
precisely which guideline the district court was departing from, since
several different guideline applications were possible. Consequently,
the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

